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In the current research, we investigated whether belief in conspiracy theories satisfies 
SHRSOH¶VQHHGIRUXQLTXHQHVV.  We found that the tendency to believe in conspiracy theories 
was associated with the feeling of possessing scarce information about the situations 
explained by the conspiracy theories (Study 1) and higher need for uniqueness (Study 2).  A 
further two studies using two different manipulations of need for uniqueness (Studies 3 and 
4), showed that people in a high need for uniqueness condition displayed higher conspiracy 
belief than people in a low need for uniqueness condition. This conclusion is strengthened by 
a small-scale meta-analysis.  These studies suggest that conspiracy theories may serve 
SHRSOH¶VGHVLUHWREHXQLTXHKLJKOLJKWLQJDPRWLYDWLRQDOXQGHUSLQQLQJRIFRQVSLUDF\EHOLHI  
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After traumatic events such as terrorist attacks (e.g., the Charlie Hebdo shootings in 
France) or climatic disaster (e.g., the 2001 tsunami in Japan), many people start to disbelieve 
official explanations in favor of what are known as conspiracy theories²explanations that 
refer to hidden groups working in secret to achieve sinister objectives (e.g., Goertzel, 1994).  
For example, one conspiracy theory attributes the Charlie Hebdo attacks to Mossad as an 
effort to make Muslims look bad.  Another attributes the 2001 tsunami to secret US 
government weapons testing in the ocean.   
In recent years, psychologists have made significant ground in understanding what 
draws people to conspiracy theories.  For example, personality traits such as openness to 
experience (Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010; Swami et al., 2011), distrust 
(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999; Goertzel, 1994; Wagner-Egger & 
Bangerter, 2007), low agreeability (Swami et al., 2010, 2011), narcissism (Cichocka, 
Marchlewska, & Golec de Zavala, 2016) and Machiavellianism (Douglas & Sutton, 2011) are 
associated with conspiracy belief.  In terms of cognitive processes, people with stronger 
conspiracy beliefs are more likely to overestimate the likelihood of co-occurring events 
(Brotherton & French, 2014), to attribute intentionality where it is unlikely to exist 
(Brotherton & French, 2015; Douglas, Sutton, Callan, Dawtry, & Harvey, 2016), and to have 
lower levels of analytic thinking (Swami, Voracek, Stieger, Tran, & Furnham, 2014).  
Conspiracy theories also appear to have important consequences, such as negatively 
influencing health decisions (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; Oliver & Wood, 2014), decreasing 
intentions to engage in politics (Butler, Koopman, & Zimbardo, 1995; Jolley & Douglas, 
2014b), LQFUHDVLQJSHRSOH¶VGHVLUHWROHDYHWKHLUZRUNSODFH'RXJODV	/HLWHLQSUHVVand 
reducing environmental behavioral intentions (Douglas & Sutton, 2015; Jolley & Douglas, 




2014b; Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; van der Linden, 2015).  Further, some 
research suggests that conspiracy theories may perform certain functions for the self, allowing 
people to regain a sense of control (van Prooijen & Acker, 2015; Whitson & Galinsky, 2008), 
order (Van Harreveld, Rutjens, Schneider, Nohlen, & Keskinis, 2014), power (Gray, 2010; 
Sapountzis & Condor, 2013), and to relieve death anxiety (Newheiser, Farias, & Tausch, 
2011).  The current research aims to further contribute to current knowledge about the 
personal needs that may be satisfied by conspiracy belief.  Among the self-related motivations 
that could influence belief in conspiracy theories, we will argue that the need for uniqueness 
VKRXOGSOD\DUROHLQSHRSOH¶VDGKHUHQFHWRFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHV0RUHVSHFLILFDOO\RXU
general claim is that people with a high need for uniqueness should be more likely to believe 
in conspiracy theories. 
Need For Uniqueness: From Products to Beliefs 
Need for uniqueness is defined as the need (or desire) to be reasonably different from 
others (Lynn & Snyder, 2002).  Need for uniqueness is both a stable trait (Snyder & Fromkin, 
1977) and a state that depends on feedback concerning the (lack of) perceived difference 
between oneself and others (Snyder & Fromkin, 1980).  People with higher need for 
uniqueness are interested in unique, original, or scarce products (and commodities in general), 
because they are an indicator of uniqueness (e.g., Brock, 1968; Brock & Brannon, 1992; 
Lynn, 1991; Lynn & Harris, 1997; Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980; Tian, Bearden, & 
Hunter, 2001).  Moreover, a number of studies have shown that people with high need for 
uniqueness prefer rare commodities (like experiences or messages) to a larger extent than 
people with low need for uniqueness (Fromkin, 1970; Lynn, 1991; Powell, 1974). 
Consuming, however, is not the only way that people can choose to express their 
uniqueness.  Indeed, Snyder and Fromkin (1980) suggested that people can also express their 
sense of difference through their beliefs.  Abelson (1986) goes further by formulating the 




theoretical perspective WKDW³EHOLHIVDUHOLNHSRVVHVVLRQV´ This idea is illustrated by 
examining popular linguistic expressions using a belief-possession metaphorIRUH[DPSOH³WR
DFTXLUHDEHOLHI´ RU³WRKROGDEHOLHI´ (Abelson, 1986, p. 230).  Indeed, building on Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980/2002), the metaphors are the basis of our conceptual system, which in 
turn, define our everyday realities.  Hence, the belief-possession metaphor may serve as a hint 
to the idea of beliefs as possessions.  Finally, to the same extent that people can express their 
uniqueness through their unique possessions, people who hold unique beliefs can demonstrate 
their unusual taste, as Abelson (1986) suggests, by saying that people who cultivate original 
views about the world convey to others the special nature of their personality.  
Why Need for Uniqueness Should be Related to Conspiracy Beliefs 
 We argue that people high in need for uniqueness should be more likely than others to 
endorse conspiracy beliefs because conspiracy theories represent the possession of 
unconventional and potentially scarce information.  Indeed, reference to secret plots is an 
inalienable dimension of what a conspiracy theory is really like (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; 
Keeley, 1999; Swami & Furnham, 2014).  Moreover, conspiracy theories rely on narratives 
that refer to secret knowledge (Mason, 2002) or information, which, by definition, is not 
accessible to everyone, otherwise it would not be a secret and it would be a well-known fact.  
People who believe in conspiracy theories FDQIHHO³VSHFLDO´, in a positive sense, because they 
may feel that they are more informed than others about important social and political events.  
To quote Billig (1987): ³7KHFRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\RIIHUVWKHFKDQFHRIKLGGHQLPSRUWDQW, and 
immediate knowledge, so that the believer can become an expert, possessed of a knowledge 
not held even by the so-FDOOHGH[SHUWV´S.  At the time our studies were conducted, this 
idea had never been tested empirically. 
Overview 




In the current research, we tested the overarching hypothesis that the desire to feel 
unique should foster belief in conspiracy theories.  Specifically, in four studies, we tested 
three implications of this hypothesis.  First, we argue that people who believe more in 
conspiracy theories should think they hold scarce information that other people do not have, 
representing a way to feel unique.  Thus, in Study 1, we tested whether people who endorse 
conspiracy theories are more likely to think that they possess scarce and secret information 
about various conspiracy theories.  Second, we argue that people with a high chronic need for 
uniqueness should believe in conspiracy theories to a larger extent than people with a low 
need for uniqueness.  Hence, in Study 2, we tested whether people with a higher need for 
uniqueness also believe in conspiracy theories to a larger extent.  Third, we argue that a 
situational increase in the need for uniqueness should increase adherence to conspiracy 
theories.  In Studies 3 and 4, we therefore tested the causal effect of need for uniqueness on 
conspiracy belief by experimentally manipulating need for uniqueness, and we predicted that 
manipulating need for uniqueness should result in higher conspiracy beliefs.  In all the studies 
presented in WKLVSDSHU³Ze report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions (if 
any), all manipulations, DQGDOOPHDVXUHVLQWKHVWXG\´DFFRUGLQJWRWKHUHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
made by Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn (2012). 
Study 1 
To provide support for our overarching hypothesis, it is necessary to demonstrate that 
high believers in conspiracy theories assume that they possess information that other people 
do not have about the events in question.  Therefore, in this study our main prediction is that 
the more people believe in conspiracy theories, the more they should have the impression that 
they possess scarce information about those events. 
Of course, it could be that people believe in conspiracy theories without having 
information about them.  If this is the case, our prediction would make less sense because 




there would be no specific information to back up these beliefs.  Although previous research 
supports the idea that people generally feel their conspiracy beliefs are based on evidence 
(Bost, Prunier, & Piper, 2010) or information (Uscinski, Klofstad, & Atkinson, 2016), in this 
study we added a measure to ensure this was also true for our participants.1 
Finally, it could be argued that it is not the content of the belief that can help people 
feel unique, but the extremeness of this belief.  Hence, one could reasonably object to our 
general hypothesis that some people with high need for uniqueness could feel unique by 
strongly rejecting conspiracy theories.  To be able to exclude this alternative hypothesis, we 
therefore tested for the quadratic trends for all the main analyses reported in Study 1.2  
Method 
Study pre-registration and sample size.  We pre-registered the study (materials and 
hypothesis) on the OSF (https://osf.io/daus4/).  For this study, we had no clear expectation 
regarding the effect size.  Having more than 180 participants, however, we could expect a 
decent power if our effect was similar to the average correlation in social psychology (namely 
r = .21, see Richard, Bond, & Stokes-Zoota, 2003). 
Participants.  We recruited 200 French participants (Mage = 24.85, SDage = 8.53, 121 
females) for an online study presented as DVXUYH\IRFXVLQJRQSHRSOH¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQs about 
the world and the elements that people take into account to form opinions.  In exchange for 
their participation, participants could take part in a lottery involving two 25 euros gift cards 
(approximatively US$35).  We excluded minors (under 18 years of age in France, n = 10)3 
and the final sample therefore consisted of 190 participants (Mage = 25.32, SDage = 8.50, 117 
females).  The majority of the participants were students (63.2%). 
                                                          
1
 This study was originally part of a wider investigation.  For this reason, we present only the materials and the 
statistical analyses relevant to the current investigation.  The complete original materials are presented in 
Electronic Supplementary Material 1. 
2
 In line with this reasoning, we did the same in Study 2. 
3
 Inclusion of these participants did not change the results. 




Materials and procedure.  After reading the instructions, participants began the 
section described as Section 1 of the study by completing a 10-item French version (Lantian, 
Muller, Nurra, & Douglas, 2016) of the Belief in Conspiracy Theories Inventory (Swami et 
al., 2010).  We chose to use this scale (Į = .82) because it refers explicitly to specific familiar 
FRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVHJ³7KHDVVDVVLQDWLRQRI-RKQ).HQQHG\ZDVQRWFRPPLWWHGE\WKH
lone gunman, Lee Harvey Oswald, but was rather a detailed, organised conspiracy to kill the 
3UHVLGHQW´DQVZHUHGIURP Completely false to 9 = Completely true).  Hence, we reasoned 
that using this kind of scale increases the likelihood that people would recruit facts or 
information to answer.  
Then, participants moved to Section 2 in which they completed the main dependent 
variable, namely perceived scarcity of the information that they may have used to answer the 
conspiracy belief scale.  To measure this perception of scarcity (Į = .74), we created a three-
LWHPVFDOHHJ³7KHLQformation I used to answer questions asked in the previous Section 1 
DUH´that participants could answer by using a 9-point scale (1 = Disclosed to the public view 
to 9 = Hidden from public view). 
 Participants then indicated to what extent they relied on different potential sources of 
beliefs when they answered the conspiracy belief scale, on a 9-point scale (1 = Strongly 
disagree to 9 = Strongly agree).  The choice of these potential sources of beliefs was based 
both on a pre-test4 and the literature.  Among these potential sources of beliefs5, the two most 
relevant to our hypothesis ZHUHDLQIRUPDWLRQREWDLQHGE\RWKHUV³2WKHUSHRSOHDOORZed me 
to acquire the information used to answer the questions asked in the first section (discussion 
with my friends, etc.)´ and ELQIRUPDWLRQREWDLQHGE\WKHPVHOYHV³,Jot by myself the 
                                                          
4
 This pretest was administered on 15 participants (Mage = 25.80, including 8 men) who completed a conspiracy 
beliefs measure followed by WKHRSHQTXHVWLRQ³What means did you use to be able to answer the previous 
TXHVWLRQV"´ 
5 To save space, the other potential sources of beliefs measures are presented in Electronic Supplementary 
Material 1.  The following Section 3 is not directly related to the question hypothesis and thus not presented in 
this Materials and procedure Section, but are presented in detail in Electronic Supplementary Material 1. 




information used to answer the questions asked in the first section (e.g., media, reading, etc.)´
To avoid order effectsDOOWKHEHOLHIV¶VXEMHFWLYHVRXUFHVwere presented randomly.  Finally, 
participants completed demographic information before being debriefed and thanked. 
Results and Discussion 
In accordance with our basic premise, not only people believed that in order to answer 
questions about conspiracies they relied on information obtained by themselves (M = 6.44, SD 
= 2.02), but they thought they did so to a larger extent than they believed they relied on 
information provided by others (M = 5.15, SD = 2.54), t(189) = 5.31, p < .001, &RKHQ¶Vdz = 
0.39.  More important, in line with our hypothesis, we found that the more people believed in 
various conspiracy theories, the more they thought they possessed scarce information about 
these various conspiracies, r(188) = .46, 95% CI [.34, .57], p < .001.  It is also noteworthy 
that the quadratic trend was not significant, t(187) = 1.31, p = .191. 
 The results of this study therefore allow us to confirm that people with a high level of 
conspiracy belief are more likely to think that they possess scarce information about various 
conspiracies.  Hence, in line with the first implication of our general hypothesis, this result 
could be interpreted as a crucial feature of conspiracy narratives, which may look attractive 
for people with high need for uniqueness because it could lead them to feel unique.  
Study 2 
After establishing in Study 1 that belief in conspiracy theories could serve the purpose 
of feeling unique, the goal of Study 2 was to directly test whether people with a chronic high 
need for uniqueness believe in conspiracy theories to a larger extent.   
Method  
Study pre-registration and a priori power analysis.  Again, we pre-registered the 
study (materials, hypothesis, and exclusion criteria) on the OSF website.  This pre-registration 
documentation, as well as data and syntax files, are available online (https://osf.io/b36nj/). 




To determine our sample size, we conducted an a priori power analysis (Cohen, 
1992), based on a previous unpublished study in which we found a positive linear relationship 
between need for uniqueness (measured with the Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness scale; 
Lynn & Harris, 1997; Į = .90) and conspiracy beliefs (measured with the Conspiracy 
Mentality Questionnaire; Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013; Į =  .88), 
r(194) = .25, 95% CI [.11, .38], p < .001.  From this analysis we found that we needed around 
160 participants to reach a 90% power.  To increase safety margins, we rounded up to 200 
participants, giving an a priori power of .95 to detect this effect. 
Participants.  A total of 217 MTurk workers (Mage = 32.14, SDage = 10.80, 101 
females) participated in our study.  We restricted this study to participants located in the 
United States.  The study was presented as a study on the relationship between different 
personality traits and participants were paid US$0.30 for their participation.  As planned, we 
excluded participants who failed to correctly answer the attention check (see below, n = 9).  
The final sample consisted of 208 participants (Mage = 32.44, SDage = 10.89, 96 females). 
Materials and Procedure.  Our main measure of need for uniqueness was an adapted 
version of the Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness scale (Lynn & Harris, 1997), a 4-item 
scale (1 = Not at all to 5 = Extremely) that assesses self-reported desire to be different from 
RWKHUVHJ³I prefer beLQJGLIIHUHQWIURPRWKHUSHRSOH´7KHIRXULWHPVZHUHDYHUDJHGLQWR
a single score with higher scores indicating a higher need for uniqueness (Į = .90). 
For exploratory purposes, we also used a multi-dimensional measure of need for 
uniqueness: The Uniqueness Scale (Snyder & Fromkin, 1977).  This 32-item scale (1 = Strong 
disagreement to 5 = Strong agreementLVFRPSRVHGRIWKUHHGLPHQVLRQV³lack of concern 
regarding others' reactionsDFWLRQVDQGVRRQ´Į = .³GHVLUHWRQRWDOZD\VIROORZUXOHV´
(Į = .DQG³SHUVRQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSXEOLFO\GHIHQGKLVRUKHUEHOLHIV´ (Į = .66; Snyder & 
Fromkin, 1977, pp. 522ʹ523).  All the negative items were recoded, such that a higher score 





rules, and the willingness to publicly defend their beliefs.  Because this scale has been 
criticized for being too focused on public and risky displays of uniqueness, which is an overly 
restrictive expression of uniqueness (Lynn & Harris, 1997; ùLPúHN	<DOÕQoHWLQ), we 
always used this scale in last position in the questionnaire, so it could not alter the 
relationships between our two main variables of interest (i.e., the Self-Attributed Need for 
Uniqueness scale and Generic Conspiracist Beliefs Scale). 
We assessed beliefs in conspiracy theories with the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale 
(Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013), which is a 15-item scale (1 = Definitely not true to 5 
= Definitely trueFRPSRVHGRIJHQHULFVWDWHPHQWVDERXWFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVHJ³A lot of 
important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest´7KH
items were combined into a single score with a higher score indicating a higher level of belief 
in conspiracy theories (Į = .94).  We also included the single-item conspiracy belief measure 
(Lantian et al., 2016).  This measure is introduced by a brief introductory paragraph 
mentioning that some official versions of events have been ³disputed´²without mentioning 
WKHH[SUHVVLRQ³FRQVSLUDF\WKHRU\´7KHQSDUWLFLSDQWVDQVZHUHGhow they think about the 
following sentence³I think that the official version of the events given by the authorities very 
RIWHQKLGHVWKHWUXWK´ (1 = Completely False to 9 = Completely True).  Each participant was 
randomly assigned to four possible orders of scale presentation, again with the uniqueness 
scale always presented last.   
The final part of the questionnaire contained demographic questions.  To remove 
participants from the analysis who did not complete the study diligently, we also used the 
following filler TXHVWLRQ³This is a filler we use to detect participants who do not pay 
attention to the questions we ask. Please tick the sixth box from the left and continue´.  
Finally, participants were thanked and debriefed.  




Results and Discussion 
 We first tested our main prediction, that people with a higher need for uniqueness 
should have a higher level of belief in conspiracy theories.  In line with this hypothesis and 
with our preliminary work, we found that a higher need for uniqueness (measured by the Self-
Attributed Need for Uniqueness scale) was associated with higher belief in conspiracy 
theories (measured with the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale), r(206) = .17, 95% CI [.03, 
.30], p = .015.  The test of the quadratic effect of belief in conspiracy theories on need for 
uniqueness was not significant, t(205) < 1.  The linear association was replicated with the 
single-item measure of belief in conspiracies, r(206) = .18, 95% CI [.04, .30], p = .011, and 
the quadratic effect was still not significant, t(205) < 1. 
For the more exploratory part of our analysis, we explicitly conducted a post-hoc 
exploration of the data (Wagenmakers, Wetzels, Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012) 
that provides more detail about the relationship between need for uniqueness and belief in 
conspiracy theories.  First, we computed the bivariate correlation matrix between all the 
measures of need for uniqueness used in this study: the Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness 
scale, Uniqueness Scale, and the three underlying factors of the Uniqueness Scale (see Table 
1).  The three factors composing the Uniqueness Scale were positively correlated each other 
but not very strongly, suggesting that these three measures are not perfectly redundant.  Then, 
we tested the relationship between the three underlying factors of need for uniqueness and 
conspiracy belief (both linear and quadratic regressions).  To avoid the use of too many 
statistical tests, we combined our two measures of belief in conspiracy theories (i.e., the 
Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale and the single-item measure of belief in conspiracies).  All 
the analyses were done at the Bonferroni-corrected alpha level of p < .008 (Į =  .05/6 tests).  
Among these tests, only one test was significant for this threshold, namely the positive linear 
relationship between the desire to not always follow rules and belief in conspiracy theories, 




r(206) = .22, 95% CI [.08, .34], p = .002.  Theoretically, this effect is consistent with the 
VWHUHRW\SLFDOSLFWXUHRIWKH³RXWIURPWKHFURZG´EHOLHYHULQFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHV$FFRUGLQJ
WRVRPHDXWKRUVWKLV³GHVLUHWRQRWDOZD\VIROORZUXOHV´LVWKHIDFWRUWKDW³PRVWclosely 
reflects the desire to express uniqueness and eschew conformity.´Stern, West, & Schmitt, 
2014, p.143).  As this result was yielded by an exploratory analysis, replication is needed to 
strengthen this finding. 
Study 3 
After showing a correlational relationship between the need for uniqueness and beliefs 
in conspiracy theories, the main goal of Study 3 was to manipulate the level of need for 
uniqueness.  Therefore, the main hypothesis of this study is that people for whom a high need 
for uniqueness is activated should manifest higher conspiracy beliefs than people for whom a 
lower need for uniqueness is activated.  To test this hypothesis, after priming need for 
uniqueness, we measured belief in a (potentially) newly formed conspiracy theory (see Bost 
& Prunier, 2013; van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013; van Prooijen & van Dijk, 2014, for similar 
procedures).  To do so, participants read a bogus newspaper article about a bus accident in 
Moldova (a country for which our participants usually have no information).  This bogus 
newspaper article was sufficiently ambiguous to enable participants to believe it could be the 
result of a conspiracy.  The advantage of such a procedure is that participants had no previous 
knowledge and pre-existing beliefs about this specific event. 
In addition to our main hypothesis, we also wanted to test whether our effect would be 
stronger for people with lower chronic need for uniqueness.  Indeed, because people with high 
need for uniqueness should have a chronic need to feel unique, the need for uniqueness 
priming may be less efficient for these participants (see Maimaran & Wheeler, 2008, for a 
similar reasoning in a different domain).  Finally, to increase the statistical power to detect the 
desired effect, we decided in advance to conduct these analyses by controlling the initial level 




of belief in conspiracy belief (Judd, McClelland, & Ryan, 2008; see our pre-registration 
documentation).  This control seemed the most relevant, because previous work showed that 
the best predictor of a specific conspiracy belief is the belief in other conspiracy theories (e.g., 
Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011). 
Method 
Power analysis and a priori exclusion criteria.  We pre-registered the study 
(materials, targeted sample size, hypothesis, and exclusion criteria) on the OSF website 
(https://osf.io/x9y8u/).  To determine the sample size we needed in this study, failing to know 
the desired effect size, we based the power analysis on the only two indicators of the effect 
size we had about the relationship between need for uniqueness and conspiracy beliefs: r(194) 
= .25 (the unpublished study mentioned earlier) and r(206) = .17 (Study 2).  Based on these 
estimates, our targeted effect size was about Ș² = .042 HTXLYDOHQWWRD&RKHQ¶Vd of 0.42) and 
with an Į error of .05 and 80% of power, we determined that we needed a minimum of 90 
participants in each condition. 
Regarding the a priori exclusion criteria, we planned to exclude participants who were 
born or who lived in Moldova (i.e., the country used in our vignette), as well as participants 
who reported a high level of knowledge about Moldova (i.e., those who answered 8 or 9 to the 
question provided for that purpose at the end of the study, see the Materials and Procedure 
section).  Finally, we planned to exclude participants who showed a high level of suspicion by 
explicitly formulating the hypothesis. 
Participants.  We recruited 223 French psychology undergraduate students (178 
females and 5 respondents who did not indicate their gender) with an average age of 20.95 
years (SD = 3.75).  The study took place within two sessions spaced by 14 days (N = 210 for 
Session 1 and N = 183 for Session 2, among which 170 participants had participated in 
Session 1).  As decided in the a priori exclusion criteria, we excluded from the final sample 




participants who, at the end of the experiment, explicitly formulated the hypothesis (n = 12), 
participants who were born or lived in Moldova (n = 1), and those who reported having a 
strong level of knowledge of this country (n = 1).  Because a certain number of participants 
clearly did not follow the manipulation instructions, we asked two independent judges to 
estimate for each participant whether he/she appropriately followed the instructions 
(dichotomous answer yes/no).  We discarded from the sample participants for whom the two 
judges agreed they did not comply with the instructions (n = 12).6  By considering only 
participants who were present for both sessions, our final sample included a total of 143 
participants (Mage = 20.93, SDage = 4.10, 121 females). 
 Materials and Procedure.  Session 1 took place at the beginning of a class.  The 
study took the form of a questionnaire containing a brief measure of conspiracy beliefs 
baseline level (with the single-item conspiracy belief measure, Lantian et al., 2016 as in 
Studies 1 and 2).  Participants also completed the Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness scale 
(Lynn & Harris, 1997, Į = .86) to evaluate their baseline level of need for uniqueness.  
Contrary to the previous study, we increased the number of points in this scale (from five to 
eight points).  The order of the two scales was counterbalanced.  Finally, participants provided 
their age and their gender. 
 Session 2 took place 15 days later and allegedly dealt with the relationship between 
writing and reading skills.  We used another experimenter to minimize suspicions.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions.  To 
manipulate need for uniqueness, we used a procedure proposed by Cheema and Kaikati 
(2010).  This procedure takes the form of a writing task in which participants are asked to 
                                                          
6
 If we keep these participants in the sample, the results are less clear and do not allow us to conclude about the 
effect of need for uniqueness on conspiracy beliefs (p = .23 and .21, respectively for the manipulation check and 
the main dependent variable). 




think and write about the importance of individuality (vs. conformity), which is supposed to 
increase (vs. decrease) the need to feel unique. 
 After this manipulation, participants read the bogus newspaper article about a bus 
accident in Moldova (see Electronic Supplementary Material 2).  This accident allegedly 
killed 45 people, among which 8 politicians members of the political opposition at the time of 
the event.  The article was designed such that it could potentially raise suspicions about a 
conspiracy (e.g., although politicians were killed, none were from the political party in power; 
one of the dead politicians wrote a book about scandals involving the party in power).  After 
reading this article, participants answered four questions among which two referred to 
conspiratorial interpretations (e.g., ³7KHFRDFKFUDVKZDVGHOLEHUDWHO\SODQQHGE\WKH
established power in the country´) and two referred to anti-conspiratorial interpretations (e.g., 
³This event is the result of an unfortunate accident due to uncontrollable factors [e.g., bad 
weather, mechanical failure, etc.]´).  To be consistent with the cover story, we also included 
two filler items about the information processing easiness linked to the content of the article.  
These six items were presented in a 9-point Likert scale format (1 = Strongly disagree, 9 = 
Strongly agree).  We computed a global score by averaging the answers on the four critical 
items (after reverse-coding the two anti-conspiratorial items) with higher scores meaning 
stronger conspiracy beliefs (Į = .86). 
 To ensure that the origin of the incident would not be considered by default as a 
fortuitous accident or a political conspiracy (i.e., ceiling or floor effect), as well as the 
unidimensionality of the construct, we pretested the materials on 15 participants (Mage = 
22.27, SDage = 2.96), including 8 males.  Results showed neither ceiling nor floor effects, and 
acceptable variability (M = 4.98 on 9, 95 % CI [3.85, 6.12], SD = 2.05).  An exploratory 
factor analysis with one-forced factor (using the maximum likelihood method) on the four 




items from the scale suggested one factor explaining 77% of the variance.  Moreover, we 
observed very good internal consistency (Į =  .91). 
 Finally, participants completed the Self-Attributed Need for Uniqueness scale (Lynn 
& Harris, 1997, Į = .85, again with 8-point scales), corresponding to the manipulation check.  
Participants were also asked to indicate if they were born or if they have lived in Moldova, 
their level of knowledge of this country (1 = Very low knowledge, 9 = Very high knowledge), 
their age, and their gender.  To check the level of suspicion, we included an open question 
asking participants to guess the goal of the study. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check.  We first conducted an independent sample t-test on our 
manipulation check measure.  This analysis confirmed that participants had a higher level of 
need for uniqueness in the individuality condition (M = 4.80, SD = 1.28, n = 67) than in the 
conformity condition (M = 4.37, SD = 1.25, n = 76), t(141) = 2.05, p = .042, [0.02, 0.85], Ș²p 
= .029. 
Belief in a conspiracy theory.  Our main hypothesis was that the manipulation of 
need for uniqueness should induce a higher level of adherence to a conspiracy theory in the 
individuality condition than in the conformity condition.  To increase statistical power, we 
planned to control for the baseline level of conspiracy belief.  Our additional hypothesis was 
that the effect of the experimental manipulation on conspiracy beliefs should be stronger for 
participants who had a low chronic need for uniqueness than on participants who had a high 
chronic need for uniqueness. 
We tested these two predictions within the same regression model.  This model had 
the conspiracy beliefs level as a dependent variable and as predictors, we first used the 
experimental conditions (coded -0.5 and 0.5 respectively for the conformity condition and 
individuality condition), the baseline level of need for uniqueness (in a mean deviated form), 




the baseline level of belief in conspiracy theories (in a mean deviated form), as well as all the 
two-way and three-way interactions7.  This model revealed that none of the interactions were 
significant (all ps for interactions > .10), which leads us to reject our additional hypothesis 
about the differential effect of the experimental manipulation on conspiracy beliefs as a 
function of the level of chronic need for uniqueness.  Because none of the interactions were 
significant and because the effect with or without controlling for the baseline level of belief in 
conspiracy theories were essentially the same8, we simply moved to a model comparing the 
two conditions.  This model revealed a marginally significant effect of experimental 
condition, t(141) = 1.79, p = .078, 95 % CI [-0.05, 0.96], Ș²p = .022, such that participants in 
the individuality condition had a higher level of conspiracy beliefs (M = 4.97, SD = 1.65, n = 
67) than participants in the conformity condition, (M = 4.52, SD = 1.41, n = 76) as expected. 
Although the effect found in this study was only marginal, it suggests that the 
tendency to believe in a conspiracy can be influenced by the need for uniqueness.  In addition, 
this study did not reveal a moderation of this effect by the baseline level of need for 
uniqueness.  However, because our main finding was only marginally significant, Study 4 was 
intended to replicate this finding, but also to use a different need for uniqueness manipulation 
and a more diverse sample.  
Study 4 
 To manipulate the need for uniqueness, we adapted a procedure used in the domain of 
motivated self-concept (Kunda & Sanitioso, 1989; Sanitioso, Kunda, & Fong, 1990).  In this 
previous work, Kunda and Sanitioso showed that people who were led to believe that being 
extraverted (or introverted) was related to positive consequences were more motivated to 
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 We used this model because it allowed us to test our predictions, but also to test for possible confounds when 
an interaction is predicted (see Muller, Yzerbyt, & Judd, 2008; Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2004). 
8
 The condition effect controlling for the baseline level of belief in conspiracy theories was also marginally 
significant, t(140) = 1.72, p = .087, 95 % CI [-0.06, 0.93@Șðp =.021.  This ANCOVA model also revealed that 
the level of belief in conspiracy theories at Session 1 predicted the level of belief at Session 2, t(140) = 2.58, p = 
>@Șðp =.046. 




think about themselves as extraverted (or introverted).  Accordingly, in Study 4 the idea was 
to lead our participants to believe that trying to be unique (or trying to be like other people) 
was related to positive consequences (e.g., better academic success, higher salary, better 
quality of life, etc.). 
Method 
Power analysis and exclusion criteria.  We pre-registered the study (materials, 
targeted sample size, hypothesis, and exclusion criteria) on the OSF website 
(https://osf.io/maw5j/).  To determine the necessary sample in this study, we based our power 
analysis on the effect obtained in Study 3.  Hence, we targeted an Ș² of .19 (equivalent to a 
&RKHQ¶Vd of 0.28).  We conducted a power analysis based on this estimation with an alpha 
error of .05 and 80% of power, resulting in sample size of about 400 participants (200 
participants in each condition).   
Regarding the a priori exclusion criteria, we decided to exclude participants who did 
not comply with the task manipulating the need for uniqueness (i.e., participants for whom the 
two independent judges considered they did not comply).  Because this was an online study, 
we checked the time participants spent reading the bogus newspaper article about a bus 
accident in Moldova.  Based on previous work in the domain of reading skills (Ferrand & 
Ayora, 2009) and given the practical limit of the reading speed (Taylor, 1965), we decided to 
exclude participants who took less than 18 seconds on the questionnaire page9.  We also 
decided to exclude psychology students because of the risk of prior exposition to the 
experimental material, as well as participants who recognized not having participated 
seriously in the study (Aust, Diedenhofen, Ullrich, & Musch, 2013).  Finally, we planned to 
exclude participants who showed high level of suspicion by explicitly formulating the 
hypothesis. 
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 The text is composed of 214 words, so reading and understanding this text in less than 18 seconds (i.e., reading 
more than roughly 750 words per minute) seems unrealistic. 




Participants.  Participants for this online study were reached through various email 
lists and on various French-speaking online forums.  To motivate participation, participants 
were informed that they would be placed in a draw to win an MP3 player.  Among the 775 
participants who clicked on the link to the study, 402 of them completed it (Mage = 27.20, 
SDage = 11.97, with 296 females).  These participants were randomly assigned to the two 
conditions (different is better vs. similar is better) of this study.  As specified in the pre-
registration documentation, we excluded participants who guessed the hypothesis (n = 1), 
those for whom the two judges conjointly considered that they did not follow the instructions 
(n = 7), and one participant who cumulated the two above-mentioned exclusion criteria (n = 
1).  Moreover, despite precautions we took to avoid psychology students in the sample, six 
psychology students (n = 6) completed the study and were therefore excluded.  Regarding the 
time spent on the page devoted to the reading of the article, we removed participants from the 
sample who passed less than 18 seconds on the page (n = 4) and, as a precaution, those for 
whom the program, for an unknown reason, did not save the time spent on the page (n = 3).  
In addition to the exclusions corresponding to the pre-established criteria, we excluded other 
participants (n = 5) who seem not legitimate to keep in the final sample.10  Specifically, we 
excluded one participant who admitted in the comment section having searched on the 
internet more information about the (fictional) case mentioned in the article, one who 
admitted to taking a screenshot of the article, and one who expressed strong doubt about the 
study mentioned in the experimental manipulation.  We also identified two participants who 
spent more than 1,000 seconds on the page containing the bogus article.  In view of the time 
spent, and given the average time spent on the page (about 108 seconds) we can doubt that the 
experimental manipulation can maintain its effect.  The final sample was therefore composed 
of 375 participants (Mage = 27.06, SDage = 11.81, 277 females). 
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 The inclusion or not of these five additional participants did not change the conclusions.  




Materials and Procedure.  At the beginning of the study, participants were told that 
the computer program would randomly select several tasks for them to work on.  We did so to 
limit participants wondering about the connection between the different tasks.  In fact, all the 
participants started by reading about a (fictional) meta-analysis published in a scientific 
journal.  This fictitious study demonstrated that, in general, people who search actively to 
distinguish themselves (vs. who search actively to be similar to others, experimental condition 
randomly determined) benefit from a number of advantages (e.g., better academic success, 
better quality of life, etc.).  To strengthen this manipulation and in line with Kunda and 
Sanitioso (1989), participants were also asked to list three reasons that could, in their opinion, 
explain these advantages. 
After completing this first task, participants moved to the same belief in a conspiracy 
WKHRU\PHDVXUHDVWKHRQHXVHGLQ6WXG\Į 7he only exception was that in this study 
the order of the six items was chosen randomly.  Then, participants were asked to complete 
the manipulation check that consisted of the 8-item version of the Self-Attributed Need for 
Uniqueness scale (Lynn & Harris, 1997, Į = .87).  This measure was exactly the same as the 
one we used Study 3, except that the order of each items was randomly chosen. 
 Finally, participants reported their age, gender, and socio-economic category (and their 
study major if the question applies).  They could also report what they thought was the goal of 
the study.  Next, we used a question assessing whether participants thought they took part in 
WKHVWXG\VHULRXVO\³I have taken part seriously´ or ³I have just clicked through, please throw 
my data away´, see Aust et al., 2013).  Participants were then debriefed and thanked. 
Results  
Manipulation check.  Again, we first conducted an independent samples t-test on our 
manipulation check measure.  Surprisingly, although in the expected direction with 
SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH³GLIIHUHQWLVEHWWHU´FRQGLWLRQKDYLQJDGHVFULSWLYHO\KLJKHUOHYHORIQHHG




for uniqueness (M = 4.80, SD = 1.51, n = 193) WKDQSDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH³VLPLODULVEHWWHU´
condition (M = 4.76, SD = 1.61, n = 182), this effect was not significant, t(373) = 0.23, p = 
.82, [-0.28, 0.35], Ș²p < .001. 
Belief in a conspiracy theory.  However, another independent samples t-test on the 
belief in a conspiracy theory measure confirmed our prediction that participants in the 
³GLIIHUHQWLVEHWWHU´FRQGLWLRQKDGDKLJKHUOHYHORIFRQVSLUDF\EHOLHIV(M = 5.32, SD = 1.78, n 
= 193) than SDUWLFLSDQWVLQWKH³VLPLODULVEHWWHU´FRQGLWLRQ(M = 4.97, SD = 2.06, n = 182).  
As in Study 3 however, this effect was marginal, t(373) = 1.75, p = .081, 95 % CI [-0.04, 
0.74], Șðp =.008. 
Meta-analysis of Studies 3 and 4.  Although the predicted effects were marginal in 
Studies 3 and 4, as documented in the preregistration we had already planned to conduct a 
meta-analysis of Studies 3 and 4.  We did so by relying on the R package meta (Schwarzer, 
2007, v. 4.1-0).  We used a random-effects model11 by using the inverse variance method.  
The examination of the different indicators, Q(1) = 0.32, p = .57, I² = 0%12, revealed a good 
homogeneity suggesting that the two studies were consistent.  The estimation of the 
cumulative effect size +HGJHV¶g, see Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009) 
revealed a significant condition effect, g = 0.21, 95 % CI [0.04, 0.39], p = .016, such that 
participants in the high need for uniqueness conditions (i.e., the individuality and the 
³GLIIHUHQWLVEHWWHU´FRQGitions respectively in Studies 3 and 4) had a higher level of 
conspiracy beliefs than participants in the low level of uniqueness conditions (i.e., the 
FRQIRUPLW\DQGWKH³VLPLODULVEHWWHU´FRQGLWLRQVUHVSHFWLYHO\LQ6WXGLHVDQG 
Discussion 
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 In most cases, a random-effects model should be preferred to a simple-effect model (Cumming, 2014). 
12
 This conclusion is not reached on the sole Q test²as previous work has shown it has low power to detect 
heterogeneity when the number of studies is small²but in conjunction with a very low I² index (Higgins, 
Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003).  




 The main goal of Study 4 was to replicate Study 3 with a different manipulation of 
need for uniqueness.  We again found that participants in the need for uniqueness condition 
had marginally higher levels of belief in the conspiracy theory.  Although, Studies 3 and 4 led 
to an effect in the same direction, this effect was marginal in both studies.  In a small-scale 
meta-analysis, however, we showed that when put together, these effects were not different 
from one another and more importantly, these effects were significant overall. 
General Discussion 
 The purpose of this paper was to empirically test the proposition that conspiracy 
EHOLHIVFDQVHUYHDVDPHDQWRVDWLVI\SHRSOH¶VQHHGIRUXQLTXHQHVV:HWHVWHGWKLVJHQHUDO
hypothesis by decomposing it into three testable propositions through four studies and one 
meta-analysis.  In Study 1, our results show that participants with higher conspiracy beliefs 
were more prone to think they hold scarce information about the events explained by the 
conspiracy theories.  In Study 2, we used a correlational design to demonstrate that 
participants with higher need for uniqueness believed more in conspiracy theories.  Finally, in 
Studies 3 and 4 we used experimental designs to demonstrate that need for uniqueness could 
have a causal impact on conspiracy beliefs. 
At the time we conducted this research, we knew of no other studies assessing the 
relationships between conspiracy beliefs, scarcity, and need for uniqueness.  We recently 
discovered, however, that Imhoff and Lamberty (in press) conducted a concomitant line of 
research testing the same hypothesis.  First, Imhoff and Lamberty report two correlational 
studies also showing that people with high need for uniqueness believe more in conspiracy 
theories.  It is worth mentioning that, although these studies confirm the results we reported 
here, they too found only modest effect sizes.  Hence, it seems clear that this effect exists, but 
it is not a large effect, as is also demonstrated by the overall positive and significant 
association we obtained by meta-analyzing all relevant studies that we and Imhoff and 




Lamberty conducted, r =.20, 95 % CI [.13, .26], p < .00113.  Interestingly, in a third study, 
Imhoff and Lamberty demonstrated something we did not test in the current contribution.  
Indeed, with the goal to start establishing causality, they showed that need for uniqueness 
increases belief in a conspiracy theory (indirectly through conspiracy mentality) to a larger 
extent when only a minority (as opposed to a majority) of people allegedly support this 
theory.  On the one hand, this effect is interesting because it strengthens the idea that 
believing in conspiracy theories is a way to feel unique.  On the other hand, our work nicely 
DGGVWR,PKRIIDQG/DPEHUW\¶VZRUNE\HVWDEOLVKLQJFDXVDOLW\WKURXJKWKHH[SHULPHQWDO
manipulation of need for uniqueness. 
 Our findings can also be connected to recent research demonstrating that individual 
narcissism, or a grandiose idea of the self, is positively related to belief in conspiracy theories 
(Cichocka et al., 2016; Wilson & Rose, 2014).  Interestingly, Cichocka et al. (2016) found 
that paranoid thought mediates the relationship between individual narcissism and conspiracy 
beliefs.  The current work suggests, however, that need for uniqueness could be an additional 
mediator of this relationship.  Indeed, previous work has shown that narcissism is positively 
correlated with need for uniqueness (Emmons, 1984) and here we showed that need for 
uniqueness is related to conspiracy belief.  This overlap opens new avenues for futures studies 
that could assess not only this potential mediation, but also the incremental contribution of the 
other components of narcissism once the uniqueness dimension is controlled for. 
 The idea that need for uniqueness increases conspiracy belief may seem to be at odds 
with previous findings showing that right-wing authoritarians believe more in specific 
conspiracy theories (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; Grzesiak-Feldman 
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 To obtain this effect size, we meta-analyzed the correlations obtained in a previous unpublished study we 
mentioned in this paper, our Study 2, and Studies 1, 2 and 3 reported by Imhoff and Lamberty (in press).  We 
first transformed the correlations WR]VFRUHV)LVKHU¶VWUDQVIRUPDWLRQ for analysis and converted back to Pearson 
correlations.  We performed a random effects analysis using the inverse variance method.  Note that we observed 
a correct homogeneity, Q(4) = 5.68, p = .22, I² = 29.6%. The R syntax to reproduce these results is available 
online: https://osf.io/5323p/. 




& Irzycka, 2009).  Indeed, right-wing authoritarians are people who, among other things, 
value social conventions (Butler, 2000).  This specificity of right-wing authoritarians could 
somewhat contradict the need for uniqueness hypothesis (which could explain the modest 
effect size we found), but it is not yet entirely clear why right-wing authoritarianism is related 
to conspiracy belief.  Therefore, because right-wing authoritarianism has two other important 
dimensions, namely authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission (Funke, 2005; 
Passini, 2008), it could be that one or both of these dimensions, and not adherence to social 
conventions, are responsible for the relationship between right-wing authoritarianism and 
conspiracy belief. 
The need for uniqueness hypothesis may also appear to be at odds with previous 
research showing that feelings of uncertainty fuel conspiracy beliefs (van Prooijen & 
Jostmann, 2013; Whitson, Galinsky, & Kay, 2015).  Indeed, one could expect that people who 
feel uncertain prefer to conform to others rather than to seek differentiation (e.g., copy-when-
uncertain strategy, Laland, 2004).  We believe, however, that this does not mean that need for 
uniqueness is necessarily a mediator of the relationship between feelings of uncertainty and 
conspiracy beliefs.  In fact, both could be suppressors (Judd, Yzerbyt, & Muller, 2014) such 
that feelings of uncertainty and need for uniqueness might have stronger effects on conspiracy 
beliefs when controlling for each other.  Future work could test this interesting possibility. 
Although the current research adds to previous research, it comes with its own 
limitations.  First, in Study 4, the manipulation check measure did not reveal a significant 
increase in the need for uniqueness.  A possible explanation for this non-significant finding is 
that participants may have felt awkward saying they felt unique or not after reading that it was 
good to be one or the other to succeed in life.  In other words, it could be that this induction 
was successful at increasing the need for uniqueness, but the nature of this induction made it 
more difficult for participants to acknowledge this increase (or decrease) in need for 




uniqueness.  Given that we do not see an obvious alternative to what was manipulated in this 
study, we believe this study contributes to what we intended to show (see Sigall & Mills, 
1998).  Another possible limitation regarding Studies 3 and 4 was that we did not include a 
control condition in either study.  Therefore, from these studies we cannot claim that our 
findings are due to an increase or in fact a decrease in need for uniqueness.  However, we do 
not see this as a crucial limitation, because our goal was to induce differences in need for 
uniqueness level, not to specifically study increases or decreases in this variable or a 
qualitative switch (i.e., reasoning in terms of conformity rather than uniqueness).  Moreover, 
at a pragmatic level, including a control group would have been at the expense of statistical 
power.  For this same reason, although our hypothesis could predict that situationally induced 
need for uniqueness also increases belief in existing conspiracy theories, the likely stability of 
specific beliefs and the modest effect size of the effect reported here discouraged us to engage 
in this potentially costly investigation. 
Our research also calls for future investigations that could determine the respective 
share of the multiple potential underlying factors occurring in the relationship between need 
for uniqueness and conspiracy beliefs.  For instance, the positive association between need for 
uniqueness and conspiracy beliefs could mainly be due to scarcity, or perhaps the 
³DOWHUQDWLYH´QDWXUHRIFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVVXIILFHVWRH[SODLQWKLVREVHUYDWLRQ0RUH
generally, one can wonder if belief in conspiracy theories is only an exemplar of a broader 
association between need for uniqueness and unconventional beliefs (e.g., paranormal 
beliefs).  
 Another limitation is that we restricted our conceptualization of uniqueness to an 
individual level only.  Indeed, the self-concept is not only composed of a personal identity, 
but also a social identity (Turner & Reynolds, 2011).  According to self-categorization theory, 
people will actively categorize themselves as a member of a specific group, if, in a relevant 




comparative context, they see more differences between groups than similarities within 
groups (i.e., the meta-contrast ratio, Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).  Building on 
this, it would be informative to consider, at the group level, to what extent people who believe 
LQFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVGHILQHWKHPVHOYHVDVDSDUWRIDJURXSRI³FRQVSLUDFLVWV´DQGKRZWKH\
evaluate them), and especially, if they attempt to maximize the differences between their own 
JURXSRIDQ³LQIRUPHGPLQRULW\´DQGWKHRWKHUJURXSs.  In the same vein, we could also draw 
on the optimal distinctiveness theory of social identity (Brewer, 1991), dealing with the fact 
that people are torn between two competitive needs: the need to belong and the need to be 
different.  Indeed, belonging to a distinctive minority could satisfy both needs at once. 
 It is important to recognize that it is, as this point, difficult to generalize our results 
beyond individualistic cultures.  In this regard, a considerable amount of research suggests 
that uniqueness (considered as a manifestation of freedom and independence) is valued in 
individualist cultures (reflecting an independent construal of the self), while in collectivist 
cultures such as East Asian countries, it is, on the contrary, the maintenance of group 
harmony (the conformity) that is valued, reflecting an interdependent construal of the self 
(Kim & Drolet, 2003; Kim & Markus, 1999; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Yamaguchi, 
Kuhlman, & Sugimori, 1995).  Because we defend the idea that the link between need for 
uniqueness and conspiracy beliefs lies on the rewarding dimensions of being different from 
other people, if the cultural context does not value being different (as it is the case in 
collectivist cultures, Takemura, 2014), we could predict that the relationship between need for 
uniqueness and conspiracy beliefs should be theoretically more negligible in Japan than in the 
United States, to take two cultures prototypically considered as collectivist vs. individualist.  
 To conclude, the converging evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that 
EHOLHYLQJLQFRQVSLUDF\WKHRULHVPD\EHDZD\WRVDWLVI\RQH¶VQHHGIRUXQLTXHQHVV
Conspiracy theories are likely to appeal more to people who have a chronic need to feel 




different to others, or who are led to feel that uniqueness is an important trait.  In each case, 
we argue that conspiracy theories place people in possession of unconventional and scarce 
information that allows them to feel unique compared to others.  More generally, our work 
also demonstrates that the needs of the self should be taken in consideration for a more 
complete understanding of the functions of conspiracist thought.   
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Bivariate correlations (with 95% confidence intervals) between all the different measures of 
need for uniqueness. 
 
Notes: N = 208.  * = p < .005, ** = p < .001, *** = p < .0005 (Bonferroni-adjusted alpha for 10 bivariate correlations). 
SANU: Self-attributed need for uniqueness, US: Uniqueness scale, US-1:  Lack of concern regarding others' reactions, 
actions, and so on, US-2: Desire to not always follow rules, US-3: PersRQ¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRSXblicly defend his or her  
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4.    - .39*** 
[.26, .50] 
5.     - 
Mean/Sum 3.24 100.94 49.27 34.20 17.47 
SD 0.99 13.39 8.33 6.54 3.82 
